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Initial coin offerings typically use blockchain technology to offer 
tokens that confer some rights in return, most often, for 
cryptocurrency. They can be seen as effectively a conjunction of 
crowdfunding and blockchain. Based on a hand selected ICO white 
paper database we provide a taxonomy of ICOs to facilitate thinking 
clearly about them, analyse the various regulatory challenges they 
pose, and suggest the first steps regulators should consider in 
responding to them. At the moment, many ICOs are offered on the 
basis of utterly inadequate disclosure of information, and the decision 
to invest in them often cannot be the outcome of a rational calculus. 
Many of the hallmarks of a classic speculative bubble are present in 
many, but certainly not all, ICOs. At the same time, ICOs provide a 
new and innovative structure for raising funds to support new and 
innovative ideas and ventures, with the potential for aspects of the 
underlying structures to have an important impact on fundraising 
systems and structures in future.     
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I. Introduction 
In the past 18 months more than 1,000 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs1) have raised more than 
USD 3 billion.2 While these numbers do not indicate a global phenomenon, the growth rate is 
accelerating, with more raised in the latest six months than in the previous 3 years (at the time 
of writing). Whereas total ICO volume was 26 million USD in 2014 and 14 million in 2015, 
it rose to 222 million USD in 2016 and reached 1,266 million USD in the first six months of 
2017.3 
ICOs initially began as a mechanism among the blockchain community to attract financial 
support for new ideas and initially involved small amounts of money and small numbers of 
investors. However, as amounts raised have increased, so has interest in using ICO structures 
to raise money for ever broader purposes and among ever broader groups of investors, with 
issuance in 2017 forming one of the largest portions of early stage fundraising globally. 
Recent high profile examples have included celebrity promoters such as Paris Hilton, Wu 
Tang Clan and Floyd Meriweather. In addition, while early structures sought largely to avoid 
legal and regulatory considerations, in recent months, there has been an increasing 
involvement of major legal and advisory firms in the area. 
                                                            
1 On the legal perspective of ICOs, see Iris M. Barsan, Legal Challenges of Initial Coin Offerings (ICO), RDTF 
3:2017, 54-65; Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the 
Democratization of Public Capital Markets (October 4, 2017). Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 527. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3048104 . 
2 Cf. Olga Kharif, Only One in 10 Tokens Is In Use Following Initial Coin Offerings, 23 Oct. 2017, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-23/only-one-in-10-tokens-is-in-use-following-initial-coin-
offerings (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
3 Cf. autonomous.next, #TOKEN MANIA, online https://next.autonomous.com/download-token-mania/ 
(last accessed 31 October 2017). 
Prominent examples demonstrate that ICOs are not without flaws: some ICOs have been 
unmasked as scams and Ponzi schemes,4 while others, including the largest,5 have seen 
governance concerns come to the fore and financial regulators making enquiries. There has 
been a wide range of initial regulatory responses: from an outright ban of ICOs in the case of 
                                                            
4 Cf. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by 
Real Estate and Diamonds, Press Release (Sept 29, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-185-0 (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (stating that the SEC “today charged a businessman and two 
companies with defrauding investors in a pair of so-called initial coin offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by 
investments in real estate and diamonds. The SEC alleges that [an individual] and his companies have been 
selling unregistered securities, and the digital tokens or coins being peddled don't really exist. According to the 
SEC's complaint, investors in REcoin Group Foundation and DRC World (also known as Diamond Reserve 
Club) have been told they can expect sizeable returns from the companies' operations when neither has any real 
operations. [The individual allegedly touted REcoin as "The First Ever Cryptocurrency Backed by Real 
Estate."  Alleged misstatements to REcoin investors included that the company had a "team of lawyers, 
professionals, brokers, and accountants" that would invest REcoin's ICO proceeds into real estate when in fact 
none had been hired or even consulted. Zaslavskiy and REcoin allegedly misrepresented they had raised 
between $2 million and $4 million from investors when the actual amount is approximately $300,000.” Cf. 
Swiss regulator FINMA, FINMA closes down coin providers and issues warning about fake cryptocurrencies, 
Press Release 19 September 2018, available at https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2017/09/20170919-mm-coin-
anbieter/ (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (stating that “FINMA has closed down the unauthorised providers of the 
fake cryptocurrency "E-Coin". For over a year since 2016, the QUID PRO QUO Association had been issuing 
so-called “E-Coins”, a fake cryptocurrency developed by the association itself. Working together with 
DIGITAL TRADING AG and Marcelco Group AG, the association gave interested parties access to an online 
platform on which E-Coins could be traded and transferred. Via this platform, these three legal entities accepted 
funds amounting to at least four million Swiss francs from several hundred users and operated virtual accounts 
for them in both legal tender and E-Coins. This activity is similar to the deposit-taking business of a bank and is 
illegal unless the company in question holds the relevant financial market licence. … Unlike real 
cryptocurrencies, which are stored on distributed networks and use blockchain technology, E-Coins were 
completely under the providers' control and stored locally on its servers. The providers had suggested that E-
Coins would be 80% backed by tangible assets, but the actual percentage was significantly lower. Moreover, 
substantial tranches of E-Coins were issued without sufficient asset backing, leading to a progressive dilution of 
the E-Coin system to the detriment of investors.”. The website Top 5 Cryptocurrency Scams, available at 
http://bitcoinchaser.com/top-5-cryptocurrency-scams (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017) lists 5 scams with a total 
damage well north of 50 million USD. 
5 Regarding the record high Tezos ICO (where 232 million USD were collected while the founders had initially 
envisioned a gross income of only 10 million USD), the Swiss news website finews reports that the founders of 
Tezos (a U.S.-based couple and U.S. enterprise Dynamic Ledger Solutions) employed a Swiss foundation for 
launching its ICO in order to establish new crypytocurrency “tezzie”. According to that report, the U.S. couple 
claims 20 million USD in commissions from the Swiss foundations. Further, key people of the foundation are 
said to demand bonuses and commissions out of the Tezos ICO. At the same time the news website reports that 
it is unclear a) whether Tezos investors will receive a return for their consideration, and b) where the funds 
collected in the ICO and denominated in BTC and ETH are safekept. See Tezos-ICO: Streit um Millionen im 
«Cryptovalley» (19 Oct. 2017), available at https://www.finews.ch/news/finanzplatz/29281-tezos-ico-streit-um-
millionen. On the same ICO, another website reports violation of FINRA regulations regarding disclosure rules 
on compensation of key staff as well as on business development, and that the Tezos project has difficulties to 
find skilled staff, see “Blockchain-Projekt Tezos: Größter ICO droht zu scheitern”, 21 Oct. 2017, available at 
https://deutsche-wirtschafts-nachrichten.de/2017/10/20/blockchain-projekt-tezos-bricht-ueberraschend-
zusammen/. Parts of the news were also reported in websites fortune.com and coindesk. As of Nov. 15, 2017, 
two class actions were filed against the Tezos founders, the Tezos Foundation and Dynamic Ledger Solutions – 
the Delaware-based company that holds Tezos's intellectual property – alleging that the founders deceptively 
sold unregistered securities in violation of both federal and state law when they raised $232 million in an initial 
coin offering (ICO) in July. See Aaron Stanley, ‘Tezos Founders Hit With Second Class Action Suit’ (Nov. 15, 
2017), available at https://www.coindesk.com/tezos-founders-hit-second-class-action-suit/ (all websites last 
accessed Nov. 16, 2017). 
China6 and South Korea, to warning notices by European,7 US8 and other regulators 
reinforced by statements that securities laws could well apply and registration be necessary,9 
to more lenient approaches in other jurisdictions, with Singapore and to a lesser extent 
Switzerland as examples.10 
                                                            
6 Cf. Lulu Yilun Chen & Justina Lee, Bitcoin Tumbles as PBOC Declares Initial Coin Offerings Illegal, 4 Sept. 
2017), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-04/china-central-bank-says-initial-coin-
offerings-are-illegal (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). For further details, see infra (IV.1.). 
7 Cf. ESMA, ESMA highlights ICO risks for investors and firms, Press Release (13 November 2017), available 
at: https://www.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma-highlights-ico-risks-investors-and-firms (last 
accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (stating that “ESMA is concerned that firms involved in ICOs may conduct their 
activities without complying with relevant applicable EU legislation.”). The national regulators coordinated by 
ESMA issued similar warning notices, see e.g. BaFin, Consumer warning: the risks of initial coin offerings (9 
November 2017), available at: 
https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Meldung/2017/meldung_171109_ICOs_en.html;jses
sionid=DD4E85311A67636E46E56D0C5E78E3D3.2_cid381 (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017); Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), Consumer warning about the risks of Initial Coin Offerings (‘ICOs’) (12 Sept. 2017), 
available at: https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/initial-coin-offerings (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017); AFM 
(NL), AFM waarschuwt voor grote risico’s bij Initial Coin Offerings (13 Nov. 2017), available at: 
https://www.afm.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2017/nov/risico-ico (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). Swiss regulator FINMA has 
assembled a warning list with entities involved in suspicious activity in the ICO field. See FINMA closes down 
coin providers and issues warning about fake cryptocurrencies, Press Release 19 September 2018, available at 
https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2017/09/20170919-mm-coin-anbieter/ (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017).  
8 Cf. Securities and Exchange Commission, Statement on Potentially Unlawful Promotion of Initial Coin 
Offerings and Other Investments by Celebrities and Others (Nov. 1, 2017), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-potentially-unlawful-promotion-icos (demanding 
compliance with US disclosure rules). 
9 Cf. US Securities and Exchange Commission https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-
bulletins/ib_coinofferings (25 July 2017). The same message was conveyed by Canadian securities regulators on 
24 August 2017, see CSA Staff Notice 46-307 - Cryptocurrency Offerings; Singapore regulator MAS, MAS 
clarifies regulatory position on the offer of digital tokens in Singapore, 1 August 2017, available at 
http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2017/MAS-clarifies-regulatory-position-on-the-
offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017); The Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Thailand, SEC Thailand’s Viewpoint on ICO (Sept. 14, 2017), available at 
http://www.sec.or.th/EN/Pages/FinTech/ICO.aspx (last accessed 30 Nov. 2017). 
10 For instance, the Swiss government is seeking to foster Fintech innovation in relation to blockchain 
technology, in particular, while preserving AML and KYC requirements. The Swiss government is exploring the 
creation of a new regulated entity called a “crypto-bank”. Moreover, digital currencies are not considered 
securities (and thus subject to Swiss securities regulation) but assets. Nevertheless, FINMA has clarified that 
AML/CTF, banking and securities trading as well as collective investment rules could apply. Cf. FINMA, 
Guidance 04/2017 „Regulatory treatment of initial coin offerings“ (29 Sept. 2017). Singapore’s regulator 
MAS does not consider digital currencies as regulated funding sources or payment instruments, but as assets; in 
turn, while the MAS regulates KYC and AML requirements it does not regulate virtual currency intermediaries 
nor the proper functioning of virtual currency transactions. At the same time, on 1 August 2017, MAS clarified 
that „if a token is structured in the form of  a security, the ICO must comply with existing securities laws aimed 
at safeguarding investors’ interest. So the requirements of having to register a prospectus, obtain intermediary or 
exchange operator licences, will apply. These intermediaries must also comply with existing rules on anti-
money laundering and countering terrorism financing. … MAS does not and cannot regulate all products that 
people put their money in thinking that they will appreciate in value. But recognizing that the risks of investing 
in virtual currencies are significant, MAS and the Commercial Affairs Department have published an advisory 
alerting consumers to these risks, and are working together to raise public awareness of potential scams.“ See 
MAS, Reply to Parliamentary Question on the prevalence use of cryptocurrency in Singapore and measures to 
regulate cryptocurrency and Initial Coin Offerings, Questions No. 1494, Notice Paper 869 of 2017 (for 
Parliament Sitting on 2 October 2017). French regulator AMF announced a two-pronged approach consisting 
of a new regulatory position on ICOs on which the AMF consulted with market participants from October to 
December 2017, on the one hand, and a new programme dubbed "UNICORN", on the other hand, which is 
This paper draws on a rapidly growing database of the documentation for more than 150 
ICOs. The documents typically are those made available during the launch of the ICO and 
were gathered from three websites functioning as ICO repositories.11 As such, while we cite 
proportions of ICOs in our sample throughout this paper, these proportions should not be 
taken as being anything more than very broadly indicative, given that the total universe of 
ICOs numbers above 1000 to date.   
From this foundation, we provide a basic taxonomy for ICOs and analyse which legal 
frameworks might apply to which types of ICOs. In Parts III and IV we highlight some key 
risks for the financial system and for ICO participants. In Part V we consider possible 
responses of regulators and supervisors. Part VI concludes. 
 
  
                                                            
„aimed at providing a mechanism for ICO organizers in France to carry out their plans under the agency's 
guidance.“ Cf. Autorité des Marchés Financiers, Press Release (26 Oct. 2017), L’AMF lance une consultation 
sur les Initial Coin Offerings et initie son programme UNICORN, available at http://www.amf-
france.org/Actualites/Communiques-de-presse/AMF/annee-
2017?docId=workspace%3A%2F%2FSpacesStore%2F5097c770-e3f7-40bb-81ce-db2c95e7bdae (last accessed 
Nov. 13, 2017). 
11 Websites from which ICO documentation has been drawn include ICO Alert (https://www.icoalert.com), 
Coinschedule (https://www.coinschedule.com) and ICO-List (https://www.ico-list.com). Note that our database 
is far from complete and is unlikely to ever be complete, given the quantity of ICOs currently taking place. The 
database merely functions as evidence of the variety of ICOs and of the legal concerns we seek to address 
herein.  
II. A Taxonomy of Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) 
1. Common characteristics 
ICOs are currently taking so many different forms that the task of definition is no simple 
matter. However, the structure (following its name) is based on the offer of tokens or coins 
utilizing blockchain technology.12 As with the tokens that represent the cryptocurrencies13 
Bitcoin14 and Ether15, in an ICO the initiators establish a blockchain and grant tokens to 
                                                            
12 Cf. on the legal and governance aspects of Blockchain only from the regulators# perspective IOSCO, 
Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech) Ch. 5 (February 2017), available at 
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf; ESMA, Report - The Distributed Ledger 
Technology Applied to Securities Markets, ESMA50-1121423017-285 (February 7, 2017); ASIC, Op-ed: 
Blockchain, available at http://asic.gov.au/about-asic/media-centre/asic-responds/op-ed-blockchain/ (last 
accessed June 21, 2017). From the academic perspective, see Trautman, Lawrence J., Is Disruptive Blockchain 
Technology the Future of Financial Services?, 69 THE CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP 232 (2016); Carla L. 
Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized Ledger Technology Regulation: An 
Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV.191 (2016); Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O'Brolcháin, Paul Haynes, Governance 
in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 LEDGER 134 (2016); Trevor I. Kiviat, Beyond 
Bitcoin: Issues in Regulation Blockchain Transactions, 65 DUKE L.J. 569 (2015-16); Lewis Rinaudo Cohen & 
David Contreiras Tyler, Blockchain's Three Capital Markets Innovations Explained, INT’L FIN. L. REV. 
(2016), available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/3563116/Blockchains-three-capital-markets-innovations-
explained.html; from the French literature: Primavera De Filippi & Michel Reymon, La Blockchain: comment 
réguler sans autorité, 83 et seq, in (Nitot, T. (dir.) & Cercy N., Numérique: reprendre le contrôle, 
FRAMABOOK (2016).; Pierre-Marie Lore, blockchain: évolution ou révolution pour les contrats en France ?, 
MBA THESIS INST. LÉONARD DE VINCI (2016), available at http://www.ilv.fr/les-blockchains-sont-elles-
des-technologies-adaptees-pour-gerer-les-contrats/ (analysing vulnerabilities from a contractual perspective). 
13 See Edward D. Baker, Trustless Property Systems and Anarchy: How Trustless Transfer Technology Will 
Shape the Future of Property Exchange, 45 SW. L. REV. 351 (2015-16); V. Gerard Comizio, Virtual 
Currencies: Growing Regulatory Framework and Challenges in the Emerging FinTech Ecosystem, 21 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 131 (2017); Matthew P. Ponsford, A Comparative Analysis of Bitcoin and Other 
Decentralised Virtual Currencies: Legal Regulation in the People’s Republic of China, Canada, and the United 
States, 9 HONG KONG J. L. STUD. 29 (2015); from Spain Mª Nieves Pacheco Jiménez, Criptodivisas: Del 
Bitcoin Al Mufg. El Potencial De La Technología Blockchain,, REVISTA CESCO DE DERECHO DE 
CONSUMO 19, 6 – 15 (2016). 
14 Cf. See Catherine Martin Christopher, The Bridging Model: Exploring the Roles of Trust and Enforcement in 
Banking, Bitcoin, and the Blockchain, 17 NEV. L.J. 139, 140-155 (2016); Primavera De Filippi, Bitcoin: A 
Regulatory Nightmare to a Libertarian Dream, 3 INTERNET POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2014); Joshua J. Doguet, The 
Nature of the Form: Legal and Regulatory Issues Surrounding the Bitcoin Digital Currency System, 73 LA. L. 
REV. 1119 (2012–2013); Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS 
SCI. &L. J. 159, 171 (2012); Nikolei M. Kaplanov, NerdyMoney: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the 
Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111 (2012–2013); John O. McGinnis & Kyle W. 
Roche, Bitcoin: Order without Law in the Digital Age ,17-06 NORTHWESTERN PUB. L. RES. PAPER 
(March 7, 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2929133; Edward V. Murphy, M. Maureen Murphy, 
Michael V. Seitzinger, Bitcoin: Questions, Answers, and Analysis of Legal Issues, CONG. RES. SERV. 7-5700, 
Oct 13, 2015, available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43339.pdf (last accessed June 16, 2017); Nicholas A. 
Plassaras, Regulating Digital Currencies: Bringing Bitcoin within the Reach of the IMF, 14 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 
377 (2013); Misha Tsukerman, The Block is Hot: A Survey of the State of Bitcoin Regulation and Suggestions 
fort he Future, 30 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 1127 (2015); Peter Twomey, Halting a Shift in the Paradigm: The 
Need for Bitcoin Regulation, 16 TRINITY C. L. REV. 67 (2013); from Germany Nico Kuhlmann, Bitcoins – 
Funktionsweise und rechtliche Einordnung der digitalen Währung, COMPUTER & RECHT 691 (2014); 
Benjamin Beck & Dominik König, Bitcoins als Gegenstand von sekundären Leistungspflichten, 215 ARCHIV 
FÜR DIE CIVILITISCHE PRAXIS 655 (2015); Kerscher, Bitcoin – Funktionsweise, Chancen und Risiken der 
digitalen Währung, 2013, S. 120; Gerald Spindler and Martin Bille, Rechtsprobleme von Bitcoins als virtuelle 
Währung, 1357 Wertpapiermitteilungen (2014); Franziska Boehm   and Paulina Pesch,, Bitcoins: Rechtliche 
Herausforderungen einer virtuellen Währung – Eine erste juristische Einordnung, MMR 75 (2014). 
15 Ether has become infamous as currency used for funding the Decentralized Autonomous Organization 
(DAO), see Shier, Charlie et al., Understanding a Revolutionary and Flawed Grand Experiment in Blockchain: 
participants in it.16 To date, most ICOs have been internet-based and open to the public, 
though with varying level of direction in terms of potential participants, ranging from small 
to large invested amounts. 
In most cases the ICO occurs early in the business or project.17 While the ‘initial’ in ICO 
indicates a first offer of tokens (a.k.a. ‘coins’), in many cases the offer is in fact the second or 
third offer of the token, but merely the first one to the public. In some 68% of our cases, the 
documents reveal that tokens had been previously offered in a presale to a private investor 
group prior to the ICO. The actual number of pre-offerings is likely to be even higher given 
the poor quality and content of documentation and the current absence of standards.18 The 
large number of presales (without adequate disclosure or safeguards such as lock-up periods) 
gives rise to concern in itself since it facilitates ‘pump-and-dump schemes’ in offerings. 
2. Token or coin characteristics 
The tokens, often called Coins, that are offered typically exhibit the characteristics of a digital 
voucher and grant the participants a right of some kind. The particular right represented by 
the token varies. A token may represent a license to use a software programme (usage token), 
a membership in a community (community token) or a financial asset. Among financial 
tokens some represent a cryptocurrency (hereafter referred to as a ‘currency token’)19 while 
others promise participation in a cash flow generated by some underlying asset – hereafter 
referred to as an ‘equity token’.20 Among the equity tokens, some ICOs promise participation 
of token holders in some asset pool in a non-segregated manner, while in other cases the 
token allows participation in one single asset, separable from the other assets. Figure 1 shows 
our suggested taxonomy based on what the token represents.  
  
                                                            
The DAO Attack (August 7, 2017). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3014782; Mark Fenwick, Wulf 
A. Kaal, and Erik P.M. Vermeulen, Legal Education in the Blockchain Revolution (March 22, 2017). U of St. 
Thomas (Minnesota) Legal Studies Research Paper No. 17-05, at 31 et seq. Available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2939127 . 
16 We are not using formal financial terms such as promoters, investors and the like, as the legal status of ICOs 
remains problematic and undecided. 
17 Stellar.org & LHoFT, Understanding Initial Coin Offerings: Technology, Benefits, Risks, and Regulations – 
white paper (Sept. 2017), at p. 23, available at https://www.stellar.org/blog/understanding-initial-coin-offerings/ 
(last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
18 Lex Sokolin, global director of fintech strategy at Autonomous NEXT, estimates that 80% of ICOs are doing 
presales. Cf. Olga Kharif, Hedge Funds Flip ICOs, Leaving Other Investors Holding the Bag, Oct. 3, 2017, 
available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-03/hedge-funds-flip-icos-leaving-other-
investors-holding-the-bag (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
19 For example, one token represents one newly offered cryptocurrency SANDCOIN. 
20 The payment and equity characteristics can take several forms, for instance the token value can be modified 
by an additional component, similar to a derivative; for instance, the pay out or delivery of the reference value 
can be deferred (like in a forward contract) or conditioned on certain circumstances (for instance, that a certain 
reference index moves up or down, similar to derivatives). 
Figure 1: ICO Taxonomy by Token Reference 
 
Table 1 further shows the distribution of ICOs for consideration based on our random sample 
of hand-collected ICOs. 
 
Table 1: ICOs for Consideration by Reference Value 
 
Effectively, ICOs to date have paralleled the universe of crowdfunding techniques, from 
donation or charity-based structures to rewards to equity and debt,21 but with the token 
providing the evidence or right imparted via the process. 
                                                            
21 See on crowdfunding methodology IOSCO, Research Report on Financial Technologies (Fintech) (February 
2017), at 10 et seq., available at https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf (last accessed 
Nov. 13, 2017); ESMA, Opinion: Investment Based Crowdfunding, ESMA/2014/1378 (Dec.18, 2014), at 6, 
available at https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/2015/11/2014-1378_opinion_on_investment-
based_crowdfunding.pdf (last accessed Nov. 11, 2017); European Commission, 
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3. Consideration 
While the ICOs in our database have only been issued in return for consideration, 
consideration is not a prerequisite for ICOs. It is possible to grant tokens for the sole purpose 
of gathering a group of participants interested in blockchain technology for later use, for 
instance for social media or marketing purposes. Given we are particularly interested in the 
financial law dimensions of ICOs, however, we focus in this paper on ICOs for consideration. 
The consideration can be any type of valuable asset. In many cases, ICOs are issued for 
cryptocurrency, for instance, consideration paid in ether. While this suggests tech savviness 
and seems to appeal to the expected participant constituency the value of consideration in this 
case depends on the market value of the cryptocurrencies which currently fluctuate 
significantly. We have also seen a number of ICOs where the consideration is to be paid in 
cash (typically USD). 
The total amount collected has varied from the equivalent of a few thousand USD22 to 400 
million USD (in currency value as of 11 November 2017)23. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of ICO volumes in our database (in millions USD, currency 
value as of 11 November 2017): 
Table 2: Distribution of ICOs based on total ICO volume (in million USD). 
  
                                                            
Crowdfunding in the EU Capital Markets Union, at 8, SWD 154 final (2016), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/general-policy/docs/crowdfunding/160428-crowdfunding-study_en.pdf (last 
accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
22 Cf. the Synereo ICO from 2015, collecting 100,000 USD, for the creation not just of a social network but a 
social layer that any protocol can use and upon which many distributed applications can be built; the Orocrypt 
ICO from 2017, collecting 100,000 USD, where tokens represent precious metals valued in ETH. 
23 Cf. the Tezos ICO from 2017. 
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4. Issuing entities and backers 
In addition to a website and often a YouTube video, ICOs typically involve documentation 
called a ‘white paper’. A ‘white paper’ is defined in Wikipedia24 as:  
an authoritative report or guide that informs readers concisely about a complex issue 
and presents the issuing body’s philosophy on the matter. It is meant to help readers 
understand an issue, solve a problem, or make a decision.  
 
The UK and Australian governments often issue white papers on issues, and the Wikipedia 
definition captures the purpose of such documents very well. The white papers that typically 
accompany an ICO are different beasts altogether, and bear no relation at all to the sort of 
prospectuses that typically accompany an offering of securities. Rather, ICO white papers 
tend to be a simple description of the project and the structure in which tokens will be used to 
support it.  
White papers for ICOs typically reveal very little about the issuing entities and their backers. 
These white papers often fail to give a physical, postal or other contact address. In 20% of the 
cases in our sample, the ICO documentation failed to convey any information at all about the 
issuing entity. Where the issuing entity was mentioned, 41% mentioned the country of origin 
and provided a postal address. That means, in total, of all ICOs in our sample so far more 
than 43% of the issuers did not disclose valid postal contact details. 
 
5. Legal information and applicable law 
Given that ICOs are not subject to specific regulatory requirements and that they are 
frequently structured to avoid existing legal and regulatory requirements, not surprisingly, the 
content of white papers is utterly inconsistent. The only consistent factor tends to be a 
technical description of the underlying technology for which funding is sought, as well as 
some description of the potential use and benefits of said technology.  
Only 28,5% of the ICOs in our sample mention the law applicable to the ICOs. In 50% of the 
cases the white paper excluded investors from certain countries from participation. In 69% of 
the cases there is no information at all as to the regulatory status of the ICO. Almost all ICOs 
rely on legislative loopholes or, more accurately, what the issuing entity hopes (or prays) is a 
loophole or grey area.  
This cavalier disregard of the need to inform a participant as to who their funds are going to, 
and what rights are being given in return for these funds, only makes sense when one 
appreciates the particular mindset of many issuers of ICOs, a mindset facilitated by 
(optimistically) the innocence of the stereotypical crypto-geek about legal or other 
requirements or (less optimistically) the greed of participants who are literally prepared to 
give money to entities on the basis of such extraordinarily scant information purely for the 
hope of short-term speculative gains. This mindset is perhaps best described as anarcho-
capitalism. It is the idea that the world would work really well without government or 
regulation. As financial contributions to an ICO can be made in cryptocurrency, and benefits 
returned to participants in the same way, or in other digital ways, many issuers of ICOs seem 
to believe that these instruments exist beyond the jurisdiction of national laws and courts. We 
do not accept this belief – courts are loath to cede jurisdiction – and we have analysed and 
                                                            
24 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_paper (last accessed 10 Nov. 2017). 
dismissed it in the context of blockchain and other distributed ledger systems in previous 
work.25 Yet whether this belief is genuinely held or merely opportunistic, what matters is that 
issuers are acting upon it, and participants are going along for the ride, at least until major 
losses are incurred.     
 
III. ICO Risks and Policy Considerations 
1. Information asymmetry 
The informational situation with most ICOs is uncertain at best. In 19% of our sample the 
white papers provide merely technical information about the product or process to be 
developed. In 21% of the cases the white papers do not provide any information at all about 
the initiators or backers. In 25% of the cases the white papers do not offer any description of 
the project’s financial circumstances, i.e. nothing about how the capital collected is to be used 
and in what stages, etc. In 82% of the cases the white paper is silent on whether the funding 
to be provided by several participants will be pooled or remain segregated. (We speculate that 
pooling is widespread, given the lack of sophisticated governance structures necessary for 
asset segregation). Information on how the initiators plan to further develop the technology 
that is to be funded is also usually lacking. 
In most ICOs in our sample, potential participants are given so little financial information 
that their decision to fund the ICO cannot be based on a rational calculus. This is not always 
the case. Some ICOs are professionally documented by lawyers clearly schooled in the 
customs of the securities markets. However, mostly, the information provided is utterly 
inadequate, and consists, typically, of a description of technology that the initiator wishes to 
develop and often little else; and even this is not verified in any way. In no cases in our 
sample did an external auditor certify the ‘facts’ presented in the white paper. 
This is all remarkably different from initial public offerings of securities (IPOs). In our view, 
the only similarity between IPOs and ICOs is the similarities between the acronyms for each, 
which could in fact help to mislead investors.  
2. Capital misallocation 
At the time of writing in late 2017, it seems that ICO initiators are relying on the sort of 
classic market frenzy that typifies a bubble. While far from all ICOs meet their funding target 
– in our sample 6.5% have not reached the required minimum cap26 – apparently, 
                                                            
25 D Zetzsche, RP Buckley & DW Arner, “The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain”, forthcoming University of Illinois Law Review, in press, available at: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3018214 
26 6.5% of the ICOs in our sample have failed to reach the set minimum cap, while 6% of all ICOs in our sample 
managed to meet their subscription goals. For 25.17% of our sample, we lack reliable information on the 
subscription status. 13.25% of ICOs in our sample are not yet at the offering stage and can thus not be taken into 
consideration. The average subscription rate of those samples that have passed the pre-ICO stage and are now in 
the offering stage or have finalized it the offering stage is 33.44%. The average subscription rate of ICOs where 
the offering period has passed is 37.23%, as weighted by number of ICOs.  
So far, 6,5% of the samples in our ICO have failed but not reaching the required minimum cap. 25,83% of the 
samples are still within the crowdsale phase.* 
 
 
oversubscription is particularly common among the larger, more prominent ICOs.27 Another 
indicator for investor sentiment is the fact that less than 10% of the tokens acquired by 
investors can be put to use; the rest are merely up for trading, indicating purely speculative 
instruments.28 
But even where trading is expected it is far from certain that ICO participants can trade their 
tokens. Transfer issues related to tokens cause very difficult legal issues in the countries 
where the tokens were created; these issues are for the most part overlooked by the all-to-
greedy investors. For instance, in Switzerland – one of the leading crypto jurisdictions – the 
transfer usually requires an assignment which is to be provided in written form. The digital 
alternative – signature by way of a digital signature – is by far too complicated and 
cumbersome in practice, for the most part since the ICO participants from all over the world 
do not have such a digital signature as specified in Swiss law. Prior to transfer, new solutions 
must be "invented" and come along with delay and legal uncertainty. 
This observable overexcitement is a well-known indicator of the sort of irrational market 
behavior that has been seen many times before.29 These bubble characteristics will not only 
harm individuals who lose money, but also lead to a misallocation of capital and in fact 
potentially jeopardize the benefits of using blockchain based crowdfunding mechanisms more 
generally. Rather than channeling money to the most productive use, as markets should do, 
there are many signs that many ICOs are channeling money to recipients for their own 
personal use, in a range of frauds and scams.30 
3. Weak legal protections 
In only 29% of our cases do the white papers contain any information on the applicable law. 
In 31% of cases the white papers do not provide the name of the initiator nor any background 
                                                            
27 Cf. Eric Risley, Steve Payne, John Ascher-Roberts, “Most ICOs Fail: A Tale of Two Worlds”, available at: 
http://architectpartners.com/ecosystem_thoughts/most-icos-fail-a-tale-of-two-worlds/ (last accessed Nov. 15, 
2017) (arguing that of a database comprising over 100 ICOs at least 46 ICOs met their funding objective and 
raised 1.6 billion USD, or 36 million USD each since June 2017, while 51 ICOs did not reach their funding 
goals). For instance, the world largest-to-date ICO Tezos collected 20 times the 10 million USD the founders 
had initially envisioned 9 months prior to the ICO, see Marc Hochstein, “Tezos Founders on ICO Controversy: 
'This Will Blow Over'” (Oct. 25, 2017), available at: https://www.coindesk.com/tezos-founders-ico-controversy-
will-blow/ (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). S 
28 Cf. Olga Kharif, Only One in 10 Tokens Is In Use Following Initial Coin Offerings, 23 Oct. 2017, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-23/only-one-in-10-tokens-is-in-use-following-initial-coin-
offerings (citing data gathered by Token Report analyzing the use of 226 coin sales). 
29 For the classic treatments, see C. Kindleburger, Manias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises 
(Macmillan 1996); H. Minsky, “The Financial Stability Hypothesis”, Levy Economics Institute Working Paper 
No. 74 (1992). 
30 Cf. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Exposes Two Initial Coin Offerings Purportedly Backed by 
Real Estate and Diamonds, Press Release (Sept 29, 2017), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press-
release/2017-185-0 (stating that the SEC “today charged a businessman and two companies with defrauding 
investors in a pair of so-called initial coin offerings (ICOs) purportedly backed by investments in real estate and 
diamonds. The SEC alleges that [an individual] and his companies have been selling unregistered securities, and 
the digital tokens or coins being peddled don't really exist. According to the SEC's complaint, investors in 
REcoin Group Foundation and DRC World (also known as Diamond Reserve Club) have been told they can 
expect sizeable returns from the companies' operations when neither has any real operations. [The individual 
allegedly touted REcoin as "The First Ever Cryptocurrency Backed by Real Estate."  Alleged misstatements to 
REcoin investors included that the company had a "team of lawyers, professionals, brokers, and 
accountants" that would invest REcoin's ICO proceeds into real estate when in fact none had been hired or even 
consulted. Zaslavskiy and REcoin allegedly misrepresented they had raised between $2 million and $4 million 
from investors when the actual amount is approximately $300,000.” 
information on them (such as the address). In 33% of cases the name given as the author of 
the white paper is different from the entity specified as the ICO’s issuer / initiator. Without 
the basic information as to who stands behind the ICO, the impact of private law liability as a 
correcting factor is severely limited. This is regardless of the law which applies – any legal 
action must rest on knowledge of who has collected the consideration. If the parties to a 
transaction cannot be established with certainty, the law’s arms are tied.  
4. Systemic risk 
With an estimated volume of 3 billion USD to date the ICO market seems to be too small to 
justify regulatory action based on systemic risk concerns. However, this number is probably 
far too small as many ICOs rely on cryptocurrency. The overall market volume of 
cryptocurrencies is estimated to be in the billion 200 USD range.31 Further, in our small 
random sample, with more than 150 ICOs in which we have been able to calculate the 
consideration, the overall value is some 9.5 billion USD, and the average is some 70 million 
USD per ICO. If, as reported, there are some 1,600 ICOs worldwide, and our sample includes 
some of the larger ones and is skewed in that way, we would ‘estimate’ (or, more accurately, 
guess) an overall ICO volume that is much higher and exceeds by far 10 billion USD at the 
time of writing in late 2017.  
Further, even if the estimate of 3 billion USD is correct (which we doubt), the growth is 
remarkable. For instance, in September 2017 alone 37 ICOs have collected at least USD 850 
million, leading to a third quarter volume of 1.32 billion USD.32 And a specialized website 
reported for a single week of October 2017 the opening of 24 ICOs.33 This leads us to support 
the assumption that the bubble builds itself up much fast, and thus the risk of overpriced 
ICOs is much greater when compared with other overoptimistically priced asset classes. 
Other FinTech examples demonstrate how fast a business can move from being too-small-to-
care, to too-big-to-ignore, to too-big-to-fail.34 For instance, the Bitcoin bubble built up much 
faster than any other time asset classes before (see figure 2).   
                                                            
31 Jenima Kelly, Cryptocurrencies' market cap hits record $200 billion as bitcoin soars, Nov. 3, 2017, available 
at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets-cryptocurrencies/cryptocurrencies-market-cap-hits-record-
200-billion-as-bitcoin-soars-idUSKBN1D31I6 (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
32 Olga Kharif, Only One in 10 Tokens Is In Use Following Initial Coin Offerings, 23 Oct. 2017, available at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-10-23/only-one-in-10-tokens-is-in-use-following-initial-coin-
offerings (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017).  
33 Seline Jung, Token Report: 2 Fintech ICOs & 2 Hard Forks, 10 Oct 2017, available at 
https://medium.com/tokenreport/token-report-2-fintech-icos-2-hard-forks-9cba9827565d (last accessed Nov. 13, 
2017). 
34 The concept of a progression from “too-small-to-care to “too-big-to-fail” was initially developed by Douglas 
W. Arner & Janos Barberis, Regulating FinTech Innovation: A Balancing Act, ASIAN INSTITUTE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW (Apr. 1, 2015), http://www.law.hku.hk/aiifl/regulating-fintech-
innovation-a-balancing-act-1-april-1230130-pm/; and was developed further in DW Arner, J Barberis and RP 
Buckley, “The Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?”, (2016) 47 (4) Georgetown Journal of 
International Law, 1271.   
Figure 2: Major bubbles since 1990 vs. Bitcoin: Percentage Change35 
 
 
Money market funds offer a prime example. Three of the largest players in this sector 
(Vanguard, Fidelity and Schwab) were established in 1975, 1946 and 1971 respectively. Yet, 
in 2014, Alibaba started to offer a new, fully online fund to its existing customer base. Within 
nine months, Yu’E Bao was the world’s fourth largest MMF in the world (US$90 billion), on 
par with old players such as Vanguard and Fidelity,36 and today it is the world’s largest 
money market fund at roughly US$ 225 billion.37 
While the traditional banking sector has been reluctant to invest in ICOs, we see some 
alternative investment funds focusing on ICOs to provide to a wider range of investors 
exposure to the current, bubble-induced profits. Further, venture capitalists are seemingly 
becoming more and more active in the pre-ICO stage. In particular, it has been reported that 
110 crypto hedge funds38 were active in the ICO / cryptocurrency markets since 2011, with 
84 of them established in 2017, managing assets of 2.2 billion USD; and the first crypto fund-
of-fund was established in October 2017.39 While the involvement of professional investors 
                                                            
35 Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-29/bitcoin-s-epic-rise-leaves-late-
1990s-tech-bubble-in-the-dust (last accessed Nov. 30, 2017). 
36 Bill Powell, Alibaba: The $200 Billion ‘Open Sesame’, NEWS WEEK (Sep. 8, 2014); 
http://www.newsweek.com/2014/09/19/alibaba-200-billion-open-sesame-268937.htm 
37 Cf. Tjun Tang, Yue Zhang & David He, The Rise of Digital Finance in China – New Drivers, New Game, 
New Strategy, THE BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP 4 (2014), 
http://www.bcg.com.cn/en/files/publications/reports_pdf/BCG_The_Rise_of_Digital_Finance_in_China_Oct_2
014.pdf (last visited April 6, 2017); Shaohui Tian, Alibaba’s Yu’e Bao Becomes Largest Money Market Fund 
Globally, XINHUA NET (April 28, 2017), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/28/c_136243985.htm (last 
visited June 16, 2017).  
38 See on crypto hedge funds Edmund Mokhtarian & Alexander Lindgren, Rise of the Crypto Hedge Fund: 
Operational Issues and Best Practices for Institutional Cryptocurrency Trading (October 19, 2017). Stanford 
Journal of Law, Business, and Finance, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3055979 . 
39 Cf. Jemima Kelly, Maiy Keidan, Bitcoin ‘boom’ failing to attract big name investors, 23 Oct. 2017, available 
at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/bitcoin-investers-crypto-currencies-hedge-funds-
a8014666.html (last accessed 23 November 2017) (citing data from technology research house 
autonomous.next). 
could promote market maturity, it also strengthens the link to the established banking sector 
and thus enhances systemic risk. 
 
IV. Legal Assessment 
Given the variety of ICOs, a one-size-fits-all legal analysis of ICOs is simply impossible. 
Any legal assessment must consider the particularities of the individual offerings.  
1. Legally relevant conduct 
While some ICOs take the form of donations (and thus look similar to donation-based 
crowdfunding), by far most ICOs promise some direct benefit in return for the consideration. 
However, often the benefit is not of a financial nature. In some cases the token can be used 
similarly to a license or a gift card (and thus look similar to rewards-based crowdfunding), 
and it can grant any set of rights the initiator chooses to offer. 
Depending upon how the promise is expressed, and upon the structure of the ICO and 
governing jurisdiction, a contract or partnership (or possibly even a trust) relationship may 
possibly arise.40 The important point is that issuing the commitment to the public and 
accepting the consideration on this basis is legally relevant conduct. The people who make 
those promises are bound by their commitments; and breach will result in liability. This may 
seem like stating the obvious, but we do so because a significant part of the tech community 
appears to believe that blockchain-based conduct falls outside the scope of the law – a 
proposition we have disproved elsewhere.41  
2. General consumer protection legislation 
Once qualified as legally relevant action, in most countries contracts with the public comes 
along with specific legislation to ensure protection of consumers. For instance, if no more 
specific legislation applies, German legislation would confer private law prospectus liability 
as special case of culpa in contrahendo,42 while French law subjects any intermediary in 
goods to rules of promotional communication which come close to prospectus regulation and 
include a statement “by an independent expert with sound repute and experience that certifies 
the existence of the goods on which rights are proposed and advises on the liquidity of the 
rights acquired.”;43 further, statutory liability and intermediary regulation applies in this 
case.44 In Australia, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has announced 
that when the Corporations Act (Cth) does not apply to an ICO, the offering will still be 
subject to Australian consumer laws,45 which include prohibitions against unconscionable, 
misleading and deceptive conduct towards investors.46 Australian ICOs are likewise governed 
                                                            
40 Cf. D Zetzsche, RP Buckley & DW Arner, “The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain”, forthcoming University of Illinois Law Review, in press. 
41 D Zetzsche, RP Buckley & DW Arner, “The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain”, forthcoming University of Illinois Law Review, in press. 
42 See the leading case German Supreme Court (BGH), 24 April 1978 - II ZR 172/76, BGHZ 71, 284; for 
details, see Emmerich, in Münchener Kommentar zum BGB, 7th ed. 2016, at ¶135 et seq. 
43 Cf. Barsan, Legal Challenges (n. 1), at 61. 
44 Cf. Barsan, Legal Challenges (n. 1), at 61. 
45 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “Initial Coin Offerings,” Sep 28 2017, 
http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/digital-transformation/initial-coin-offerings/.  
46 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), ss 18, 20, 21, 22.  
by general laws against fraud.47 Similar consumer safeguards exist all over the EU and EEA 
due to European harmonized consumer protection legislation.48 For instance, in the UK the 
Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Consumer Protection Act 1987, and the Misrepresentation 
Act 1967 are all likely to apply.49 The same is true for the equivalent consumer protection 
laws in the rest of Europe.  
Further, if ICO participants are consumers, private international law will limit the discretion 
with which ICO backers can determine the applicable law. Under most private international 
law regimes, contracts between commercial entities and consumers are subject to the 
consumer protection laws in force in the consumer’s country of residence, or at least the 
rights granted in that jurisdiction are upheld.50   
Some may argue in some civil law jurisdictions that the acceptance of money in return for a 
promise is not a commercial activity; relying, again, on the fact that the ICO is being issued 
by a non-commercial entity (such as an association / a club, a foundation or a trust). 
However, the fact a trust, foundation or association is acting is no bar to it acting in trade or 
commerce. Any ongoing project with a profit expectation – either direct or indirect – suffices 
to establish a commercial activity. 
Thus, as a common denominator, since ICOs are offers to the public (i.e. consumers) by some 
commercial enterprise, where a consideration is required in order to participate, the general 
consumer protection legislation of the relevant country will apply. 
In some cases, however, some specific legislation could apply and displace the general 
consumer legislation. While this is not the case in all countries to the same extent, two fields 
of law are particular noteworthy in displacing consumer legislation. For one, if ICO 
participation results in a membership in a company or partnership, company or partnership 
                                                            
47 Denham Sadler, “ASIC set to move on ICOs,” InnovationAus.com, Sep 8 2017, 
http://www.innovationaus.com/2017/09/ASIC-set-to-move-on-ICOs.  
48 The European consumer protection framework rests on the European Directive on Consumer Rights 
(2011/83/EU) and is supplemented by specific conduct- or product-related legislation. The European consumer 
protection framework assumes the perspective that the asymmetry of information, where the commercial actor 
knows more about the product or service than the consumer, is open to abuse, and seeks to add a notion of 
fairness and good faith into the contracting between commercial actors and consumers. This is particularly true 
for technical products and services. Under that framework, depending on the details, ICOs could qualify as 
contracts for services or goods. If the contract is qualified as financial services specific financial service 
legislation applies (infra, n. 51). 
49 Consumer Rights Act 2015, the Consumer Protection Act 1987, and the Misrepresentation Act 1967. 
50 In Australia, see ACCC v Valve Corporation [2016] FCA 196; and 
http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2016/05/ACL_Comparative-analysis-overseas-consumer-policy-
frameworks_Part4-1.pdf . For the EU the ‘Rome I Regulation’ (Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations) harmonizes 
private international law all over the EU. On consumer rights, see Art. 6(1), (2) and Recital 25 of Rome I 
(“Consumers should be protected by such rules of the country of their habitual residence that cannot be 
derogated from by agreement, provided that the consumer contract has been concluded as a result of the 
professional pursuing his commercial or professional activities in that particular country. The same protection 
should be guaranteed if the professional, while not pursuing his commercial or professional activities in the 
country where the consumer has his habitual residence, directs his activities by any means to that country or to 
several countries, including that country, and the contract is concluded as a result of such activities.”); for 
instance, in the UK, pursuant to ss 31 and 47 of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the act applies to all contracts 
for the supply of goods or services (including digital content) to a UK consumer and these provisions cannot be 
contracted out of. For an analysis of the private international law dimension of ICOs see Barsan (n. 1). 
law could apply, in some cases, in lieu of consumer protection law.51 Whether this is the case 
depends on the private law qualification of the blockchain participation which we explored 
elsewhere.52 
The second important instance of specialized legislation being applicable is financial law, and 
so we take a brief look at the scope of some important types of financial regulation below. 
3. Financial law  
Financial law could assist consumers in getting protection if it applies. Based on our 
taxonomy, we argue that financial law could apply to currency and equity tokens under 
certain circumstances. While far from aiming at completeness,53 this section simply 
demonstrates that depending on the structuring of the ICO financial law can apply.  
Currency Tokens are characterized by the fact that one token reflects a right in another 
currency, either crypto or otherwise. For instance, 1 Token could reflect the value of 1 USD, 
1 EUR or 1 ETH. The ICO merely translates a currency into bits and bytes. Although the 
white papers in our sample are vague, some 52% of ICOs appear to meet our Currency Token 
test. Around the globe, regulators have implemented rules for payment services. Some 
regulators have held that those rules could apply to cryptocurrencies.54  
An Equity Token represents the right to share in a cash-flow other than a currency. Although 
most white papers again are vague, 18% of ICOs in our sample provide sufficient information 
to indicate an Equity Token has been issued.55 Regulators around the world have started to 
qualify those tokens as ‘securities’ – the SEC position on the DAO56 has been shared by other 
                                                            
51 See Art. 3(3) lit. d and Recital 9 of European Directive on Consumer Rights (2011/83/EU) (“The regulatory 
aspects to be harmonised should only concern contracts concluded between traders and consumers. Therefore, 
this Directive should not affect national law in the area of contracts relating to employment, contracts relating to 
succession rights, contracts relating to family law and contracts relating to the incorporation and organisation of 
companies or partnership agreements.”). 
52 Cf. D Zetzsche, RP Buckley & DW Arner, “The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of 
Blockchain”, forthcoming University of Illinois Law Review, in press 
53 In addition to the laws discussed herein in most countries anti-money laundering / CTF rules are likely to 
apply. Further e-money and money transmitter regulation could apply, for a detailed analysis see the articles 
cited in n. 1. 
54 Japan has recognized Bitcoin as official means of payment. In turn, legislation on payment providers applies. 
In its position of 14 February 2014, Luxembourg’s CSSF has announced that it deems the issue of virtual 
currencies (i.e. tokens with currency characteristic) out of scope of financial regulation; however, as soon as 
business exchanges virtual currencies (i.e. tokens with currency characteristic) against fiat currency the 
exchange is subject to regulation as payment service provider under the EU Payments Services Directive or the 
Electronic Money Institution Directive.  
55 Notable examples include Taas (Token-as-a-service) selling membership tokens in a closed-end crypto-asset 
fund where the token will entitle holders to 50 percent of the funds profits and payouts rely on a profit-sharing 
Ethereum smart contract. Another example includes Overstock/tZeR0, where the ICO “will raise the money 
through a private placement for accredited investors, and the token will trade on the company’s own platform. 
Most notably, it will pay holders a percentage of tZERO’s eventual profits, distributed quarterly. In other words, 
a regular old stock dividend.” See Matt Levine, This ICO Looks an Awful Lot Like a Share Offering (27 Oct. 
2017), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-10-27/this-ico-looks-an-awful-lot-like-a-
share-offering (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
56 See supra, n. 9. 
regulators,57 and gathers ground in Europe as well.58 Usually, a registration and prospectus 
requirement applies to the issuer and ICO once the token is qualified as securities, ensuring a 
minimum of investor protection. 
But further rules could apply to the intermediaries involved in issuing, promoting or trading 
the tokens. For that purpose besides the definition of ‘security’, it matters whether the 
investors’ consideration is put in one bucket from which the right or entitlement granted to 
the token holder is purchased or whether the consideration remains separate from the rights of 
other token holders. However, virtually all white papers in our sample failed to address this 
issue, and we suspect segregation is highly unusual given the sophistication and costs with 
which segregation of client money comes along.  
If investor consideration is segregated, the legislation on individual portfolio management 
needs to be considered. Here, in addition to portfolio management obligations, additional 
criteria are often applied to limit the scope of financial supervision regarding discretionary 
portfolio management. For instance, under the US IAA investment adviser is any person that: 
(1) for compensation (2) is engaged in the business of (3) providing advice, making 
recommendations, issuing reports, or furnishing analyses on securities, either directly or 
through publications.59 The lack of disclosures we often experience regarding the 
involvement, commissions and fees of other entities in the ICO make it difficult to assess 
who (besides the issuer as registrant for the purposes of securities regulation) is covered by 
US investment law. The European MiFID framework regulates portfolio management only if 
it pertains to financial instruments. For instance the German BaFin60 and the 
Finanzmarktaufsicht Liechtenstein61 hold that (equity) tokens can be financial instruments. 
Nevertheless, under the view of some regulators, doubts exist as to whether equity tokens are 
financial instruments.  
In some jurisdictions, the situation is different once assets are pooled. In this case, rules on 
collective investment could apply. However, the definition and scope of collective 
investment rules vary across jurisdictions. For instance, under the European Alternative 
Investment Management Framework – which to our knowledge applies the broadest scope of 
collective investment legislation – the central concept that determines the AIFMD’s scope is 
the alternative investment fund (AIF). The AIFMD uses the term ‘alternative’ in a somewhat 
misleading way to include all collective investment undertakings that are not governed by the 
UCITS framework and “raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it 
                                                            
57 For instance, while not specifying details, the Singapore MAS has clarified in its 1 August 2017 statement 
that securities regulation could apply to ICOs. See MAS, MAS clarifies regulatory position on the offer of 
digital tokens in Singapore, 1 August 2017, available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-
Releases/2017/MAS-clarifies-regulatory-position-on-the-offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx (last 
accessed Nov. 13, 2017). The same holds true for the British FCA, see Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Consumer 
Warning about the Risks of Initial Coin Offerings’ (Statement, 12 September 2017), available at 
https://www.fca.org.uk/news/statements/initial-coin-offerings (last accessed 15 November 2017). 
58 See from the French perspective, Barsan, Legal Challenges (n. 1), at 63 (arguing that equity tokens are ‚other 
securities equivalent to shares in companies, partnerships or other entities‘ under the MiFID framework). This 
view is shared by the authors. On other regulators, see the following text. 
59 Cf. definition of "investment adviser" under Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers Act. 
60 See https://www.bafin.de/DE/Aufsicht/FinTech/VirtualCurrency/virtual_currency_node.html, at 
„Erlaubnispflichten“ (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017) (subjecting all virtual currency trades to legislation 
applicable to financial instruments; the same principles applies to tokens in general). 
61 Cf. https://www.fma-li.li/files/fma/fma-faktenblatt-ico.pdf (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
in accordance with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors.“62 While 
equity token ICOs are likely to meet those criteria, the determination of whether there is a 
discretionary third party fund management and a defined investment policy must be assessed 
on a case-by-case basis for which detailed knowledge on the handling of the ICO 
consideration and the structure of the issuer, sponsor and other related parties is a 
prerequisite. Unfortunately, very few white papers deliver those details. In light of this 
uncertainty it is encouraging that Australian regulator ASIC has announced that such equity 
token arrangements with a discretionary management structure typically are classified as 
Managed Investment Schemes and regulated under the Corporations Act.63 
Furthermore, if the value of the coin that is offered depends upon the value of something else, 
the coin may fall within the definition of a derivative in some jurisdictions. In Australia, the 
definition of a derivative in Section 761D of the Corporations Act is particularly complex, 
and its nuances are beyond the scope of this paper, but in broad terms if the coin derives its 
value from an 'underlying instrument' or 'reference asset' which could, among other things, be 
a share, a share price index, a pair of currencies, a cryptocurrency, or a commodity, the coin 
could well be a derivative and any business offering it would need to hold an Australian 
financial services licence.64 
Finally, most regulators have stated that AML/CTF regulations apply to ICOs.65  
All in all, we conclude that financial law could apply and does apply to some of the ICOs in 
our sample. But in most cases we lack the information necessary to establish whether the 
criteria for the application of specific financial law are met; and in skilled hands, it is often 
easy to structure an ICO in such a way that it lacks one characteristic necessary for financial 
law to apply. For instance, if the reference value of the instrument is not financial in nature, 
Europe’s MiFID will not apply.  
4. Crowdfunding legislation 
The crowdfunding rules that have been established in some jurisdictions could apply under 
certain circumstances if the ICO initiators ask for consideration; the application of such rules 
tends to reduce the regulatory burden. Since crowdfunding legislation is not uniform across 
markets, we can merely summarize the most common aspects.  
                                                            
62 Art. 4(1)(a) AIFMD.; for details, see D. Zetzsche & C. Preiner, Scope of the AIFMD, pp. 49 et seq., Ch. 3 (D. 
Zetzsche, AIFMD, 2nd ed., WoltersKluwer 2015). For a criticism on the broad scope see P. Athanassiou & T. 
Bullman, The EU’s AIFM Directive and its impact- an overview in Research Handbook on Hedge Funds, 
Private Equity and Alternative Investments, ed. P. Athanassiou (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 445 and D. 
Busch & L. van Setten, The Alternaive Investment Fund Managers Directive in Alternative Investment Funds in 
Europe, L. van Setten & D. Busch eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014) 8 et seq.   
63 In Australia, see the ASIC guidance on Initial Coin Offerings at http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-
resources/digital-transformation/initial-coin-offerings/ and its guidance on Managed Investment Schemes at 
http://asic.gov.au/for-finance-professionals/managed-investment-scheme-operators/starting-a-managed-
investments-scheme/what-is-a-managed-investment-scheme/ 
64 In Australia, again, see ASIC’s guidance on Initial Coin Offerings at http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-
resources/digital-transformation/initial-coin-offerings/ 
65 See, for instance, Cf. FINMA, Guidance 04/2017 „Regulatory treatment of initial coin offerings“ (29 Sept. 
2017); European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘ESMA Alerts Firms Involved in Initial Coin Offerings to 
the Need to Meet Relevant Regulatory Requirements’ (Statement, 13 November 2017) 
https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/esma50-157-828_ico_statement_firms.pdf; Singapore 
regulator MAS, MAS clarifies regulatory position on the offer of digital tokens in Singapore, 1 August 2017, 
available at http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2017/MAS-clarifies-regulatory-
position-on-the-offer-of-digital-tokens-in-Singapore.aspx (last accessed Nov. 13, 2017). 
There are two primary forms of crowdfunding legislation. The first type modifies existing 
financial laws for small issuers and brokers of those issuers with a view to lighten the 
regulatory burden. Under the second type, regulators provide thresholds for exemptions from 
prospectus and other financial law requirements.66 For instance, the laws of the US,67 
Canada,68 Austria,69 and Germany70 limit exemptions from prospectus requirements for 
crowdfunded projects based on the size of the offering - ranging from 250,000 to 5 million 
USD/CAD/EUR - as well as the amount of money invested per retail investor – with limits 
ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 in the respective currency, depending on the country and the 
investors’ wealth. It is clear from our data presented in Table 2 (supra, at I.3.) that many 
ICOs exceed the first threshold. We lack the data to make a qualified statement on the second 
threshold. But we doubt that ICOs in the absence of institutional investments would reach the 
total volumes in the million range as reported with capital injections capped at the 
1,000/10,000 limit. 
In addition to these, many jurisdictions also provide longstanding exemptions from or 
relaxations of securities and companies law requirements relating to prospectuses and other 
aspects of offerings to small numbers of investors (typically in the form of non-public 
offerings or private companies) and/or to professional investors only. These are often used in 
the crowdfunding context and specific crowdfunding legislation often also extends or 
clarifies aspects of these sorts of offerings, with the result that many offerings (including of 
ICOs) are structured in order to fall within these sorts of structures, particularly in the context 
of offerings open to US investors. 
Australia has taken a different approach to crowdfunding and ICOs. The Corporations 
Amendment (Crowd-sourced Funding) Act 2017 (Cth) came into effect 29 September 2017 
and stipulates a new regime that requires companies engaging in crowdfunding to hold an 
Australian financial services licence with an authorisation to facilitate crowd-sourced funding 
activities.71 However, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission has reiterated 
                                                            
66 For an overview of the available types of regulation see Dirk Zetzsche & Christina Preiner, Cross-Border 
Crowdfunding – Towards a Single Crowdfunding Market for Europe (June 26, 2017). European Business 
Organization Law Review – in press, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2991610 . 
67 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for 
Issuers, May 13, 2016, available at https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-
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68 Multilateral CSA Notice 45-316 – Start-up Crowdfunding Registration and Prospectus Exemptions. 
69 See § 3 Bundesgesetz über alternative Finanzierungsformen (Alternativfinanzierungsgesetz – AltFG), see 
Roman Rericha & Raphael Toman, Neuer Rechtsrahmen für Crowdfunding - Ausbruch aus dem 
Regelungsdickicht des Kapitalmarkts?, ZFR 218, 403 (2015).. 
70 See § 2a Gesetz über Vermögensanlagen (Vermögensanlagengesetz - VermAnlG), see Lars Klöhn, Lars 
Hornuf & Tobias Schilling, The Regulation of Crowdfunding in the German Small Investor Protection Act: 
Content, Consequences, Critique, Suggestions, 13:2 EUR. COMP. L. 57 (2016). 
71 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “Crowd-sourced funding,” last updated Sep 21 2017, 
http://asic.gov.au/regulatory-resources/financial-services/crowd-sourced-funding/.  
that ICOs are different to crowd-sourced funding.72 In its information sheet, ASIC clarifies 
that “crowdfunding using an ICO is not the same as the ‘crowd-sourced’ funding that will be 
regulated by the Corporations Act from 29 September 2017.”73 ICOs are not covered by the 
new regime. As a result, traditional exemptions from offering for private and/or professional 
offers may still apply. 
 
V. Policy Considerations 
Regulatory responses require careful consideration and a thorough consideration of policy 
options and impact. We analyse the most common responses below.  
1. Outright ban  
One option is an outright ban of ICOs such as the one imposed by the Chinese and South 
Korean regulators.  
Following hard on the heels of the US Securities and Exchange Commission’s warning 
against ‘pump and dump’ ICO schemes,74 in September 2017, China and Korea announced 
their outright bans on ICOs.75 Seven Chinese government regulators, led by the People’s 
Bank of China, issued a joint statement confirming ICOs as “unauthorised illegal fundraising 
activities”,76 and explicitly treating them as financial fraud and pyramid schemes.77 The 
document defines ICOs as any fundraising processes where digital tokens, in the form of 
cryptocurrencies, are distributed to investors making financial contributions.78 Claiming 
ICOs to have caused severe economic and financial disruption,79 China called for an 
immediate stop to current ICO activities and for all completed efforts to arrange refunds.80 It 
likewise banned all ICO platforms from facilitating new issuances and all financial and 
payment institutions from dealing in ICOs.81 Sixty major local ICO platforms are currently 
                                                            
72 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “Initial coin offerings (ICOs),” MoneySmart.gov.au, last 
updated Nov 10 2017, https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/investing/investment-warnings/initial-coin-offerings-
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73 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, “Initial Coin Offerings,” Sep 28 2017, 
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78 Wolfie Zhao, “China's ICO Ban: A Full Translation of Regulator Remarks,” CoinDesk, Sep 5 2017, 
https://www.coindesk.com/chinas-ico-ban-a-full-translation-of-regulator-remarks/.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Lulu Yilun Chen and Justina Lee, “Bitcoin Tumbles as PBOC Declares Initial Coin Offerings Illegal,” 
Bloomberg, Sep 4 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-04/china-central-bank-says-initial-
coin-offerings-are-illegal.  
81 Zhao, “China's ICO Ban: A Full Translation,” supra note 5.  
under regulatory review.82 ICOs that continue to function will be “severely punished”, and 
contravening exchanges will risk having their business registration revoked and their website 
shut down.83 In short, when China decides to prohibit an activity, it certainly does so clearly 
and comprehensively (although it is reported that private trading activity in cryptocurrencies 
defies the ban84).  
In September 2017, South Korea’s Financial Services Commission likewise announced its 
imminent crackdown, explaining that ICOs appear to have directed market funds into a “non-
productive speculative direction”.85 Without defining ICOs, South Korea advised that the ban 
will encompass all forms of cryptocurrency fundraising, irrespective of their terminology and 
their underlying technology,86 and will also extend to the margin trading of 
cryptocurrencies.87 “Stern penalties” will be issued against any business or person that 
breaches this prohibition.88  
The Chinese and South Korean solutions have an initial appeal as they appear to provide 
legal certainty at low regulatory cost. Upon reflection, however, an outright ban may be an 
overly strict response. It overemphasizes the control of risk and underemphasizes the 
importance of innovation, and the great difficulty, in many jurisdictions, that innovative 
FinTech start-ups experience in securing funding. Moreover, the legal certainty may, in 
practice, prove to be somewhat spurious. Given how many different forms ICOs currently 
take, some may prove permissible unless definitions are drawn exceptionally broadly.  
In addition, historical experience with outright prohibitions on financial activities suggests 
that these are usually ineffective and/or counterproductive. Perhaps the best examples arise in 
the context of the UK’s 1720 Bubble Act (prohibiting the creation of new joint stock 
companies) or the US prohibition on onion futures.89 This debate has appeared more recently 
in the context of OTC derivatives in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, with 
the result that some jurisdictions (namely the EU) have created prohibitions in very limited 
areas (e.g. naked sovereign CDS).90  
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2. Regulatory warnings 
Another far less interventionist option is simply for the relevant regulator – usually the 
securities or financial conduct regulator – to issue warnings to the market. Many regulators 
have already done so, some repeatedly, when it comes to ICOs.  
On 28 August 2017, the US SEC issued an alert warning to investors about companies 
touting their investments in ICOs as part of ‘pump-and-dump’ or other market manipulation 
schemes to improperly influence their stock price.91 The SEC warned that trading 
suspensions had been imposed on the stock of some issuers due to claims they had made 
about their investments in ICOs, and that investors should exercise caution if current 
information about a company’s stock is not available, or if it is a non-reporting company.92 
Investors were warned to be wary of attempts to manipulate the market by spreading false 
and misleading information and create a buying frenzy, and specifically warned about 
companies that claim their ICO is ‘SEC-compliant’ without further explanation.93   
More directedly, on 25 July 2017 the US SEC issued a warning to investors about investing 
in ICOs.94 This was followed by a series of warnings by other regulators, some in much 
greater specificity, including by the Monetary Authority of Singapore on 10 August 2017,95 
Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission on 5 September 2017,96 UK Financial 
Conduct Authority on 12 September 2017,97 the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) on 28 September 2017,98 and the German regulator, BaFin, on 9 
November 201799, as well as on 15 November 2017.100 The EU’s ESMA has also issued two 
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warnings about initial coin offerings, targeted at consumers and firms respectively, each on 
13 November 2017.101   
Other warnings emphasise the danger of ‘white papers’ provided by issuers being incomplete, 
misleading, unaudited, or, in the words of BaFin, ‘objectively insufficient’. All warnings also 
indicate the high risk of fraud, particularly where the ICO is not regulated, with BaFin 
describing this risk as ‘systemic’; the UK FCA giving the example of issuers using funds 
raised in a different way to that which was marketed; and ESMA noting that several ICOs 
have already been identified as being involved in fraudulent activities. The Hong Kong SFC 
and ESMA further warn that the risk of fraud is increased by digital tokens being 
anonymously held. In addition, BaFin warns that verification of the provider’s identity and 
reputation is typically left to the consumer alone, and there is no guarantee that any personal 
data provided will be protected to German standards.  
The central element to these warnings is that ICOs are largely unregulated in all the above 
jurisdictions, and investors will have no recourse or protection if the ICO they invest in is 
unregulated. A number of regulators, such as the US SEC, Australia’s ASIC and Hong 
Kong’s SFC, note that some ICOs have features that may see them classed as ‘securities’ and 
‘regulated activities’ under securities law, which would then trigger registration or 
authorisation requirements. 
Both BaFin and ESMA warn that ICOs are generally issued by businesses in their early 
stages of development, and for this reason there is an inherently high risk of losing all one’s 
invested capital. There may also be a lack of exit options, and no, or highly limited, ability to 
trade the tokens in exchange for traditional currency. Unlike the other warnings, ESMA 
specifically warns that distributed ledger technology is untested and may be flawed or subject 
to hacking.   
ESMA’s notice directed at firms alerts them of the importance of considering whether their 
ICO activities constitute ‘regulated activities’. Where coins constitute ‘financial instruments’, 
it is likely that the firm will be engaged in regulated activities such as the placement of 
financial instruments. The warning gives a high-level summary of the EU laws which could 
then potentially be applicable to ICOs, for example the requirement for the publication of a 
prospectus, as opposed to a white paper, conduct of business rules, transparency and due 
diligence requirements, authorisation rules and prohibitions on anti-money laundering and 
terrorist financing. 
These warnings are not only a standard tool of regulators, but may well have an effect. For 
instance, it is reported that the rate of ICOs per month that missed their goals went up from 
only 7% in June 2017 to 66% in September 2017.102 This could be attributed to the chain of 
regulatory warnings. 
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Similar to earlier warnings on cryptocurrencies which had a limited impact on the Bitcoin 
hype cycle long-term103 we do not believe the ICO-related warning to end the gold rush in 
which ICO entrepreneurs seek their fortune. This is because regulators stating that ICOs may 
be unregulated encourage the very constituency benefitting from the rush to promote further 
ICOs. And those warnings to not address the deficiencies we have identified which is that the 
promoters, issuers and legal relations of ICOs are largely unknown. From a legal perspective, 
ICOs operate in the dark. This is even worse than the 17th century tulip bubble and similar 
events in the analogue centuries of finance – most of the victims then knew who had deprived 
them of their assets.  
3. Widening the scope of financial law? 
Another option would be to widen the scope of financial law and expand existing restrictions. 
For instance, if one regulates Usage Tokens that grant some rights of use in return for 
consideration, then logically into such a regulatory net would fall all license-based business 
models such as online music stores, software licenses etc., unless expressly exempted. Such a 
step would expand financial law beyond its natural limits. While consumer protection is an 
increasingly accepted objective of financial law, financial regulators may not be the best 
equipped to combat wide-ranging consumer fraud, even if perpetrated on a blockchain. What 
justifies the application of financial law when, for instance, a tulip bulb is sold via a 
blockchain-based token instead of in a gardening store? 
4. Reducing information asymmetry 
Given that most white papers in our database lack almost all the information required to 
assess which laws apply, we suggest the first regulatory step must be the enactment of 
measures to reduce this information asymmetry. In particular, all ICOs, regardless of what the 
token represents, should be required to provide the following information: 
• name, address and Legal Entity Identifier of the issuer as well as names and addresses 
of key people; 
• the target group of the ICO with any regional restrictions; 
• details of how the participants’ consideration is to be treated; 
• details of any intermediary that may store the participants’ consideration; and  
• details of all fees, costs, etc to be charged against the participants’ consideration. 
In the absence of specific legislation to this effect, financial regulators could promote best 
practices to that end and inquire into ICOs based on the assumption that financial legislation 
applies. In most jurisdictions, financial regulators have the right to start an investigation 
where there is reasonable grounds to assume that financial law does apply.  
In order to enhance efficiency, regulators could ask for evidence supporting the information 
provided by the ICO initiator (for instance, auditors may be required to certify the 
information sent to regulators). 
If the outcome of such an investigation is that financial law does not apply, the financial 
regulator could (i) issue a warning notice that a certain ICO is not regulated by any financial 
regulator, and (ii) forward the information regarding the ICO to the relevant consumer 
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protection agency. And if financial law does apply, financial regulators have all the 
traditional enforcement methods at their disposal. 
5. Enforcing existing laws through concerted action 
Once it is known who is behind the ICO and how the proceeds are to be used, it becomes 
possible to enforce existing laws. Since it is not certain that financial law will apply, 
concerted action from public enforcement agencies in a range of domains may be required. 
For instance, in addition to financial regulators, information could be shared with consumer 
protection agencies as well as the police and criminal investigators in the case of fraud. 
Indeed, if we were to make predictions, we would expect to see, in a range of jurisdictions, a 
series of such enforcement actions initiated by regulators precisely to send a message to the 
market that simply raising money on a blockchain does not put the activity beyond the 
purview of relevant laws. In other words, watch this space, especially in the countries that are 
hosting most ICO activity. The series of warning notices issued by European regulators could 
well signal the advent of the regulators’ less generous attitude. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
The paucity of research available on ICOs is only matched by the paucity of information 
typically available to ICO participants prior to their decision to participate. Furthermore, as 
most recent legislative initiatives have focused on financial actors, the regulatory situation of 
many ICOs is unclear, as they vary in form and structure and will often exist in the very grey 
areas in terms of regulatory treatment. Based on our analysis, we believe ICOs will in many 
cases raise consumer protection issues, but only in some cases will financial regulators be 
able to take action. 
While some regulators have taken decisive steps, including an outright ban of ICOs, we 
prefer a more nuanced approach, especially as funding to support innovative, high-tech 
activities is so difficult to raise in many countries. Our approach is first to seek to reduce the 
key issue regarding ICOs, which is information asymmetry. Most financial regulators, 
worldwide, have the right to require information from anyone if there are serious grounds to 
assume that financial legislation applies. Acquiring this information would enable, as a 
second step, the enforcement of existing legislation rigorously in a concerted action among 
consumer protection agencies, financial regulators and criminal investigators.  
One of the difficulties with many ICOs is their cross-border dimensions. Where consumers 
from many countries are involved, it will be difficult to determine a lead regulatory agency 
(and it may be that no agency is interested in leading given the quantum of the costs relative 
to the small impact in their jurisdiction). Further, it will be particularly difficult to establish 
the relevant jurisdiction as long as it remains unclear who is behind the ICOs and where the 
instigators are domiciled. But this is all the more reason for regulatory cooperation globally 
to move forward and develop rules designed at the least to remove the information 
asymmetry we have identified, and the faster this is done the better. As increasing amounts of 
money flow into ICOs, some with highly uncertain prospects, the greater becomes the risk of 
a very hard landing that will severely damage risk-tolerant, younger tech aficionados, and 
thereby severely reduce access to funding for serious tech innovators who seek to take 
advantage of blockchain technology to raise funds in creative, and responsible, ways.104  
                                                            
104 The over $1.2 billion raised through ICOs in the first half of 2017 by far outstripped venture capital 
investment into Blockchain and Bitcoin firms. See autonomous.next (n. 3), p. 6. 
  
 
 
